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0075

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Update of "A Study of Harassments
and Provocations"

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

[REDACTED]
ACTING Chief, Security Analysis Group

DATE

29 May 1984

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALSCOMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

C/OPS/PSI

2.

3.

C/PPG

Att: [REDACTED]

4.

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WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVEDRegraded Confidential When
Detached From Secret Att.

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USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS~~SECRET~~

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29 May 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Policy and Plans Group

25X1 ATTENTION: [REDACTED]

25X1 FROM: [REDACTED]

(C)

Acting Chief, Security Analysis Group

SUBJECT: Update of "A Study of Harassments
and Provocations" (U)


1. Attached herewith are vignettes culled from the Security Analysis Group's holdings for inclusion in the Security Committee (SECOM) Study of Harassments and Provocations update. Recruitment attempts are not included as previous memoranda stated that recruitment attempts are outside the purview of the SECOM study. (C)

2. Case 1 can be utilized in an unclassified version of the booklet; however, Cases 2 and 3 cannot be. Case 1 was obtained verbally from an Agency staff employee while Case 2 was obtained from a U.S. military intelligence document, and Case 3 pertains

25X1 [REDACTED] The information contained in the final paragraph is from a travel agency information folder and is included as the Security Analysis Group views the information garnered from the travel documents as prime aids in selecting persons of interest to foreign intelligence services. Since this is open source material of 1983 vintage, it may be used in an unclassified version of the SECOM booklet. (S)

Attachments

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CASE 1

Recently the teenage son of a government employee participated in a student tour of the Soviet Union. Upon their arrival at the airport, the other students were processed quickly; however, when this young lad's turn came, he was directed to an adjacent room and instructed to open his suitcase. During the search of the lad's belongings, he was questioned relative to his father's occupation to which the boy responded that his father was in the media field, an occupation the father had been in previously. The boy was also queried about an ordinary notebook that was with his possessions, and he replied that his school assignment was to record his observations about the trip. Of interest is the fact that this boy was the only one of the group subjected to the above treatment.

It appears that this young man was singled out for additional harassment at a social gathering in Kiev where he was approached by a reporter, carrying a tape recorder, who was pleased with the lad's general remarks, switched to a question relative to the placement of military equipments in Europe. Apparently displeased with the boy's response, the reporter had the taping session stopped.

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CASE 2

Within the very recent past, two military attaches, one from a North American country, the other from a Western European nation, and both posted to their respective embassies in Moscow, were traveling in the USSR. They stopped in a city and eventually the two attaches, minus their wives, began to stroll through the city. They subsequently arrived near a Soviet military establishment and noticed other people walking along what appeared to be a shortcut which they followed. Within a period of time, the attaches were challenged, stopped, and escorted to a room where they were questioned. The West European presented his credentials and did not encounter too much trouble; however, the North American was without his documentation and was put through some questioning. Although the West European vouched for the other as a fellow military attache, the interrogators paid little heed to his and the other's protestations relative to the detention. The Soviets were agreeable to permitting the West European to depart the compound, but he refused to leave his companion. After a period of time, the Soviets allowed the two to leave for their hotel.

The moral of this story is that official documentation should be carried at all times and an individual should double check to ensure that his documentation is on his or her person. (S)

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CASE 4

Case 3 aptly demonstrates that internal services have the capability to determine where a visitor will be located and will act upon that information. As a point of where they receive that type information, one need not look any further than the visa application. For visits to the USSR, a visa application must be submitted 35 days prior to the date of departure. Surely ample time to know who and what you are and where you are destined.

It is interesting to note that the USSR requires that permission be received to photograph factories engaged in civil production, railway stations, airports, river ports, and government buildings. Needless to say, permission to photograph these will draw attention to the photographer due to the permission caveat. Photographing military objects, fuel stores, and establishments as well as naval ports, railway junctions, tunnels, bridges, scientific research institutions, laboratories, radio, telephone, and telegraphic stations is prohibited as are photographs taken while flying over the territory of the USSR. So keep your camera packed away to avoid difficulties while flying over the USSR or in one of its airports.